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In the face of the Court's apparent disregard of the law of the flag,
extension of the reasoning applied in Rhoditis would leave virtually no
contact insufficient for the application of American law. Maintenance
of a United States office could be the critical factor rendering a legitimate
foreign shipper liable under the Jones Act. Foreign shipowners are en-
couraged to locate their "base of operations" elsewhere, lest they are
forced to shoulder a burden they would not otherwise encounter.
Another necessary consequence of this decision is the additional
burden the already overcrowded United States courts can look forward
to in the way of unnecessary, unwarranted, and ill-advised litigation by
foreign seamen attempting to take advantage of the liberal provisions of
the Jones Act rather than proceeding in the appropriate foreign juris-
diction. The Supreme Court has held that the Jones Act is "welfare
legislation .. .entitled to a liberal construction to accomplish its benef-
icent purposes."'" This pronouncement is in line with a trend in ad-
miralty law manifested most recently by the decision in Rhoditis. Despite
the humanitarianism of this action, reasoned, logical, consistent develop-
ment of the law is perhaps more to be desired. An examination by the
Court, not only of the direction of their decisions in this area, but of the
motivating forces behind them might well be in order."2
JOHN E. HODGE, JR.
Admiralty-Wrongful Death Action Under General Maritime Law
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.' the Supreme Court of the
United States held for the first time that an action will lie under general
maritime law for death caused by a violation of maritime duties. In so
holding, the court specifically overruled an 1886 decision' and took a
giant stride toward clearing up what had become a legal morass of anom-
alies and inequities.
The plaintiff in Moragne, alleging both negligence and unseaworthi-
ness, sued in a Florida state court seeking to recover damages from a
shipowner for the wrongful death of her husband, a longshoreman, aboard
a vessel on navigable waters within the state of Florida. The suit was
"E.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McCallister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949).
' See H. BAER, supra note 27, at 192.
1398 U.S. 375 (1970).
'The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida which dismissed the unseaworthiness claim but made the necessary
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 8 to allow plaintiff an interlocutory
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals,
under a procedure provided by Florida state law,4 certified to the Florida
Supreme Court the question of whether the Florida wrongful death statute
encompassed a cause of action for unseaworthiness. The Florida court
answered that question in the negative,' and on return of the case to the
court of appeals, the order of the district court was affirmed.' The Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari 7 and invited the United
States to participate as amicus curiae.3 Before discussing the court's
decision, it will be helpful to first obtain a view of the law of maritime
wrongful death as it stood before Moragne.
MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH
Martimne Duties Generally
Since ancient times seamen who have been injured or taken sick
while in the service of their ship have been entitled to maintenance and
cure,9 which includes living allowance, nursing and medical expenses,
and wages until they recover."0 This remedy is available regardless of the
presence or absence of fault, but it provides the seaman with no real com-
pensation-rather it merely sustains him during his recovery."
In seeking a compensatory recovery, however, the seaman may also
avail himself of two other grounds: breach of the duty of seaworthiness
and breach of the duty of care. The duty of seaworthiness 12 is a develop-
328 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) provides for the court of appeals to allow, at its
discretion, an appeal to be taken from an otherwise not appealable order in a civil
action if the district judge states in writing that the order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion ...
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1970).
5 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
'Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 396 U.S. 952 (1969).
'H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREmE CouRT § 1-1, at 1 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as BAER].
1 0 BAER § 1-2, at 6.
"BAER § 1-4, at 13.
12
"Seaworthiness" has been defined as the "absolute nondelegable duty of a
shipowner to provide.., a vessel 'sufficient in all respects for the trade in which it
is employed' ...and to prevent... injury [to seamen] by any part of the vessel
or equipment used in the ordinary course of their employment." Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1968).
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ment of the maritime case law and traces its beginnings back to the late
nineteenth century.' 3 Since the decision of the Supreme Court in The
Osceola,4 the generally accepted view has been that this duty imposes
liability absolutely.' 5
The duty of care was of little use to seamen until 1920 because the
duty did not extend to injuries suffered from the negligence of members
of the ship's company.'" In 1920, however, this duty was given substance
with the enactment by Congress of two statutes: the Jones Act1 7 which
incorporates part of the Federal Employers Liability Act' and gives sea-
men essentially the same rights against their employers as railroad em-
ployees are given against their employers; and the Death on the High
Seas Act' which provides a more general cause of action for wrongful
death caused by "wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any state."
Wrongful Death Actions
At first glance it would seem that, if a person to whom one of these
duties is owed were killed as a result of a breach of one of the duties, a
wrongful death action would lie against the breaching party. In fact,
however, the law on this point before Moragne was much more complex.
The problem began with the Supreme Court's 1886 decision, The Harris-
burg,2 0 which quite bluntly held that the maritime law does not afford an
action for wrongful death in the absence of a statute granting such an
action. Between 1886 and 1920 the only recoveries for maritime wrongful
deaths were in cases in which the federal courts allowed the application
of state wrongful death statutes."' Then in 1920 the two previously
I" Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 544 (1960).
' 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 547 (1960).
10 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
1746 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). In addition to granting an injured seaman a right to
sue for negligence, this act also gives the personal representative of a deceased
seaman a cause of action for the seaman's death if the seaman died because of the
negligence of the employer.
18 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). "The FELA and the Jones Act impose upon the
employer the duty of paying damages when injury to the worker is caused, in whole
or in part, by the employer's fault. This fault may consist of a breach of the duty
of care, analogous but by no means identical to the general common law duty ...
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
1946 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
20119 U.S. 199 (1886).
2 1Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970). E.g.,
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (Delaware wrongful death statute applied
where the vessels were owned by Delaware corporations).
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mentioned acts were enacted. In addition, all of the states have enacted
wrongful death statutes.' It has been in the interpretation of rights under
these various statutes that the confusion has arisen.
In 1930, ten years after the passage of the two acts, the Supreme
Court said, in dictum, that the Jones Act provides the exclusive remedy
for the death of a seaman." In 1964, in Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.,24 the Court, relying on the earlier dictum, arrived at the same con-
clusion. This would seem to indicate that any recovery for the wrongful
death of a seaman must depend upon a showing of negligence. However,
in Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,25 the Court inserted a footnote20
which has been construed by at least three authorities as meaning that
unseaworthiness is a basis for recovery under the Death on the High
Seas Act.' It is clear that the Court in Moragne attaches such a meaning
to the footnote.28  Therefore the law as it applied to seamen before
Moragne apparently was that beyond a marine league from shore, a wrong-
ful death action would lie for unseaworthiness, but that within a marine
league recovery would have to rest upon a showing of negligence under
the Jones Act.
In construing the rights of land-based workers, however, the Supreme
Court has been more generous. In 1926, in a suit by a stevedore against
his employer, the Court classified the stevedore as a seaman because he
was rendering a "maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's
crew.'"9 Thus he was allowed to recover under the Jones Act. This
holding was amplified twenty years later in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki80
in which the Court allowed an injured stevedore to sue a shipowner on
a theory of unseaworthiness despite Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion that the duty of seaworthiness is owed only to seagoing crew
2 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970).
" Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
2'379 U.S. 148 (1964).
'355 U.S. 426 (1958).
"Id. at 430 n.4, which states, "Where death occurs beyond a marine league
from state shores, the Death on the High Seas Act... provides a remedy for wrong-
ful death. Presumably any claims, based on unseaworthiness, for damages accrued
prior to the decedent's death would survive, at least if a pertinent state statute is
effective to bring about a survival of the seaman's right ......
"Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970) ; Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 159 (1964) (dissenting opinion by Gold-
berg, J.); 1 P. EDELMAN, MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH 235 (1960).
28 398 U.S. at 395.
"International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
0328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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members because only they are "exposed to the perils of the sea and all
the risks of unseaworthiness, with little opportunity to avoid those dangers
or to discover and protect themselves from them or to prove who is
responsible for the unseaworthiness causing the injury."'" Since the
decision in Sieracki the Court has extended the duty of seaworthiness to
"an electrician, a ship cleaner, a shoreside watchman, a repairman, a
rigger""2 and others. Two 1959 cases-The Tungus v. Skovcgaard3 and
United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hooks Pilots Association v.
Halecki -- illustrate the pre-Moragne status of the maritime wrong-
ful death law as applied to land-based workers as a result of the preceding
line of cases. In The Tungus the Court found the New Jersey wrongful
death statute broad enough to encompass an action for death caused by un-
seaworthiness in state waters and, therefore, allowed the survivor of an
oil company's maintenance foreman to recover for the foreman's death.
There was never any question that a duty of seaworthiness was owed to
the decedent. The only argument was whether the duty was contained in
state law as the majority claimed, 5 or in federal law (with state law
providing a remedy) as the minority claimed.3 6 In Halecki the Court
disallowed a similar suit for recovery for the death of an employee of an
electrical concern because the Court found that he was not, under the
Sieracki rule, one to whom the duty of seaworthiness was owed. The
Court restated the test as whether the person involved was doing "work
traditionally done by members of the crew. 1sT In short, the earlier line
of cases established a duty of seaworthiness to certain land-based workers
for which a wrongful death recovery could be obtained if the worker met
the Sieracki test, and if the applicable state wrongful death statute con-
tained the duty of seaworthiness.
In summary, the end result of all of these cases was that recovery for
the death of a land-based worker can often be had more easily than a
recovery for the death of a seagoing crew member. Justice Goldberg
seems to be correct in his criticism of this situation:
31 Id. at 104.
-2 1 P. EDELmAr, MmuA rzT INJURY AND DEATH 177 (1960) (footnotes
omitted).
"358 U.S. 588 (1959).
" 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
" The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959).
" Id. at 601. (Brennan, Black and Douglas, J.J., and Warren, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
' 358 U.S. at 617.
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[T]he Court today preserves an anomaly in admiralty law which has
neither reason nor justification. A seaman who is either injured or
killed while on the high seas is given a remedy for either negligence
or unseaworthiness .... a seaman who is injured in territorial waters
may also sue for either negligence or unseaworthiness ,... an injured
seaman may also sue for maintenance and cure and these claims
survive his death, . . . a nonseaman's death in territorial waters gives
rise to an action based upon the applicable state wrongful death statute
for both negligence and the general maritime doctrine of unseaworth-
iness. . . . Only the family survivors of a seaman are left without a
remedy for his death within territorial waters caused by failure to
maintain a seaworthy vessel. Only they are denied recourse to this
rule of absolute liability and relegated to proof of negligence under the
Jones Act. This disparity in treatment has been characterized by the
lower federal courts as "deplorable," "anomalous," "archaic," "un-
necessary," and "hard to understand." . . . I agree with these charac-
terizations.3 8
THE MORAGNE DE:CISION
Early in the Moragne decision the Court concludes that "the primary
source of the confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The
Harrisburg, and that the latter decision, somewhat dubious even when
rendered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law
that it should no longer be followed."" The Court attacks The Harisburg
as being quite likely wrong when it was decided.40 But the real basis of
the decision is the Court's determination that developments since The
Harrisburg have rendered that case invalid.41 The developments in
question are the rejections-partly judicial, but largely legislative--of
the old common law policy against recovery for wrongful death; these
developments include the adoption by every state and by Congress of
statutes allowing wrongful death recoveries.' On the basis of these
developments the Court concludes that "Congress has given no affirmative
indication of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for
wrongful death to persons in the situation of this petitioner. " 48
The Court rejected the argument that the Jones Act and the Death
" Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 158-59 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).39 398 U.S. at 378.
'Id. at 379-88.
"Id. at 388.
,2 Id. at 390.
" Id. at 393.
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on the High Seas Act preempted the field, concluding that a refusal to
recognize a general maritime remedy for wrongful death "would per-
petuate three anomalies of present law" : (1) "the discrepancy produced
whenever the rule of The Harrisburg holds sway: within territorial waters,
identical conduct violating federal law . . . produces liability if the
victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed,"4 5 (2) "that
identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in
death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit . . . but not within
the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthi-
ness claims,"4 and (3) "that a true seaman-that is, a member of the
ship's company, covered by the Jones Act-is provided no remedy for
death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a long-
shoreman... does have such a remedy when allowed by state statute." 47
Accordingly the Court overruled The Harrisburg. But in so doing
it went beyond the language necessary to decide the case before it and
held: "an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by
violation of maritime duties."4 The Court went to the trouble to append
to its decision a footnote which makes it clear that Gillespie is no longer
good law ;49 in short to specify that the Jones Act shall no longer be the
exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman within territorial
waters. The result of the Court's holding seems to be that a breach of
either maritime duty resulting in either injury or death on either terri-
torial or non-territorial waters will result in liability. Thus the anomalies
and inequities are eliminated, and the only holdover problem from the
pre-Moragne la:v is that created by the Sieracki line of cases, namely the
determination of who is owed these duties.
THE BENEFICIARIES
The Court left open the question as to who should be the beneficiaries
for this new right of action.50 There appear to be four possible schemes of
making this determination: (1) that followed by the Death on the High
Seas Act which provides damages "for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative,"'5 1 (2) that
"Id. at 395.
'
5 Id. at 395.
"Id. at 395.
"
7 Id. at 395-96.
,8 Id. at 409.
" Id. at 396 n.12.5 Id. at 408.
5146 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
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followed by the Jones Act which incorporates the FELA and provides a
tightly structured scheme "for the benefit of the surviving widow or
husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such em-
ployee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon
such employee,""2 (3) that followed by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,53 which provides standardized amounts in
the manner of typical workmen's compensation acts, and (4) that fol-
lowed by an applicable state wrongful death statute. The first three were
mentioned by the Court5" and would seem to be the prime candidates.
One of the reasons advanced by the Court in Moragne for its decision
is the discrepancy between various state laws; and this factor would
probably eliminate the fourth possibility. Of the remaining three, the
Court appears to lean heavily toward the first, the Death on the High
Seas Act:
It is the congressional enactment that deals specifically and ex-
clusively with actions for wrongful death, and that simply provides a
remedy-for deaths on the high seas-for breaches of the duties imposed
by maritime law. In contrast, the beneficiary provisions of the Jones
Act are applicable only to a specific class of actions-claims by seaman
against their employers-based on violations of the special standard
of negligence imposed under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
That standard appears to be unlike any imposed by general maritime
law. Further, although the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act is applicable to longshoremen such as petitioner's
late husband, its principles of recovery are wholly foreign to those of
general maritime law-like most workmen's compensation laws, it deals
only with the responsibilities of employers for death or injury to their
employees, and provides standardized amounts of compensation regard-
less of fault on the part of the employer.
The only one of these statutes that applies not just to a class of
workers but to any "person," and that bases liability on conduct
violative of general maritime law, is the Death on the High Seas Act.
The borrowing of its schedule of beneficiaries, argues the United States,
will not only effectuate the expressed congressional preference in this
area but will also promote uniformity by ensuring that the beneficiaries
will be the same for identical torts, rather than varying with the em-
ployment status of the decedent. 55
3245 U.S.C. §51 (1964).
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
"398 U.S. at 407-08.
"Id.
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Rather than determine the issue, however, the court left it for "further
sifting through the lower courts."5
CONCLUSION
Both from the standpoint of providing equitable treatment for all
maritime workers and from the standpoint of providing a more uniform
body of law in the maritime tort area, there is little question but that
Moragne is properly decided. The inequity of the pre-Moragne law, as
pointed out by Justice Goldberg, was so apparent as to be beyond dispute.
The only real choices open to the court in eliminating this inequity were
to reduce the recovery available to land-based workers so as to bring them
into line with seagoing workers, or to extend the recovery available to sea-
going workers. In light of recent trends in tort law-not only in maritime
law, but also in products liability and other areas-for the Court to have
chosen the first alternative would have been to turn back the hands of
time. Its commendable choice of the second alternative creates a uniform,
equitable and much more easily understandable body of law to replace
what had been a totally unsatisfactory morass.
Louis W. PAYNE, JR.
Civil Rights-Section 1983 Action Lies for Gross and
Culpable Negligence
Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 United States Code
section 1983,1 in recent years has been relied upon increasingly by in-
dividuals seeking redress for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights
under color of law. In Jenkins v. Averett,2 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has broadened the scope of conduct actionable under this
statute. Robert Jenkins, an 18-year-old black youth, was shot by a police-
man in the course of a pursuit following a confrontation with some white
youths in Asheville, North Carolina. Jenkins brought suit in the United
States District Court to recover damages under section 1983, and for
50 Id. at 408.
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) states:
Every person vho, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
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